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A first  look at this paper  can get one excited.  The  introduction  holds out 
the promise  of using "simple  geometry"  to exposit "the  recent  literature 
on macroeconomic  stabilization,"  namely, macroeconomics  based on 
"choice-theoretic  models." The sort of choice-theoretic  models the au- 
thors  have in mind are  Dynamic  Stochastic  General  Equilibrium  (DSGE) 
Models, and in particular  the New Open Economic Macroeconomics 
(NOEM).  The promise is repeated  when one sees that the central  geo- 
metric  tools are graphs  AS and AD (the familiar  Aggregate  Supply and 
Aggregate Demand). As the authors  say, such an exposition would be 
"especially  relevant  for ...  a field in which analytical  complexities  can 
reach  formidable  peaks and hinder  access  to  -  and communication  of  - 
its basic  results  beyond a restricted  niche of acolytes."  It sounds as if the 
paper will show how the recent  literature  compares  to traditional  text- 
books in such a way as could be used with students and even central 
bankers.  The new models would then be on a par with other AS rela- 
tionships:  classical, Keynesian,  the Natural Rate Hypothesis of Fried- 
man and Phelps, the Rational  Expectations  approach  of Lucas  and Sar- 
gent, the inflation-bias  approach  of Barro  and Gordon,  and so on. One 
then could hope to see clearly  what difference  the models make for the 
answers  to key policy questions. 
In one sense the promise is delivered: a large variety of important 
questions are addressed within a common framework.  These include 
two traditional  questions  regarding  international  transmission  of shocks: 
whether floating  gives insulation,  and whether international  policy co- 
ordination  is useful.  They  also  include  some questions  that  are  newly sub- 
ject  to debate:  For  inflation  targeting  (IT),  what is the optimal  price  index 
to target?  And has openness changed the AS parameters?  Specifically, 
has it reduced the inflation  bias (of discretion),  and has it flattened  the 
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There  are  indeed some advantages  to using the DSGE  models, relative 
to earlier  approaches  that  assumed some of the behavioral  relationships 
rather  than always deriving them from first  principles  of expected util- 
ity maximization.  Other  things equal, it is always aesthetically  pleasing 
to derive behavior from first principles of expected utility maximiza- 
tion. Personally,  I have always considered the realism of the assumed 
behavior  to be more  important  than  mathematical  derivation  from  max- 
imization,  if one has to choose. But, after  twenty years, much of the re- 
cent literature  (e.g., New Open Economy  Macro)  has succeeded  in com- 
bining verisimilitude  with maximization.  An additional  major  payoff is 
that one can do welfare analysis. 
A preliminary  quibble  regards  whether  the word "simple"  in the title 
is merited. Articles or books with "simple"  in the title are generally 
longer than those with "complete"  or "complex"  in the title.  This  paper 
is no exception. 
I do recognize  that the task is a big one. The authors'  analysis  covers 
•  Sticky  versus flexible  prices 
•  Open versus closed economies 
•  Discretion  versus commitment 
•  Fixed  versus floating  rates 
•  Nash versus cooperative  equilibria 
•  Producer Currency Pricing (PCP) versus Local Currency Pricing 
(LCP)  and also Dollar  Pricing,  a welcome added third  possibility 
This variety of cases ensures a degree of complexity.  Accordingly,  vari- 
ous simplifications  have indeed been made. For example, the produc- 
tion function  is assumed linear:  C = Output  = Zl, where / = labor  input. 
Why Call a Production  Function an AS Curve? 
I have some comments  regarding  exposition.  I might have liked to read 
something more about the objective  function,  how it compares  to those 
that include inflation,  either  on an ad hoc basis or derived. 
But my most important  presentational  question is, why aren't  there 
graphs  with  P or  inflation  on  the  vertical  axis  ?  This  is how everyone  else pre- 
sents AS relationships;  it is virtually what Aggregate Supply means. I 
understand  that,  given the length of the paper,  the authors  have made a 
tactical  decision to focus on the graphs that most directly show what 
goes on in their model. But then, given that all eleven figures  have out- Comment  121 
put on the vertical  axes, isn't it wrong to call them AS curves?  They are 
production  functions.  This  may sound like mere  semantics,  but it has se- 
rious consequences:  if we are not talking about what is usually under- 
stood by AS, then isn't the discussion of the flattening  of the AS curve (a 
putative  consequence  of globalization)  misleading? 
Although the authors  decided on space grounds not to include true 
AS curves  -  graphs with P or inflation on the vertical axis  -  they sug- 
gested that I put them in my discussant's  comment. With the authors' 
help, I will show in figures 2C2.1  and 2C2.2 the AS curves that corre- 
spond to their  model. 
Three Questions of Substance 
To turn to what are indisputably  questions of substance  as opposed to 
presentation,  let's  continue  to assume we are  talking  about  the AS curve 
as conventionally  understood, with P or inflation on the vertical axis, 
even though it is not drawn explicitly  in the paper.  First  is the question 
of the slope. It is true  that  many commentators,  particularly  Federal  Re- 
serve  officials,  have recently  claimed  that  globalization  has flattened  AS; 
intuitively,  inflation  in each  country  is affected  less by domestic  demand 
and more by developments abroad. But there is an equally plausible 
case that  globalization  has made AS steeper.  Increased  competition  gives 
firms  lower markups  (less pricing  power),  bringing  the economy closer 
to the f  rictionless  neoclassical  model. This  line of reasoning  is consistent 
with the argument  that globalization  and competition  has reduced in- 
flation  bias (Rogoff,  2004,  2006)  and should do so in theory (e.g., Romer, 
1993,  and Lane,  1997,  who are  cited by Corsetti  and Pesenti).  I elaborate 
and attempt  a reconciliation  below. 
Secondly,  is it really true that "the  empirical  consensus [is] that tech- 
nology improvements  are . . . contractionary  on impact"?  This is taken as a 
firm stylized fact that the models must be forced to obey. But I would 
have said the opposite:  positive productivity  shocks  are  often  associated 
with rapid growth and  overheating  of economy (e.g., rising real estate 
prices):  Ireland,  China,  Dubai  ...  the assertion  seems key.  Sometimes  as- 
sumptions that are claimed to be empirical  regularities  are really theo- 
retical  regularities.  They can be patterns  that originate in the authors' 
imagination,  not in real-world  data. The authors should build an em- 
pirical  case for their  claim that  productivity  improvements  are contrac- 
tionary. 
Thirdly,  and most importantly,  why is all of the analysis focused on 122  Frankel 
AS shocks and none on AD shocks;  for example, fluctuations  in spend- 
ing or money demand?  I realize  supply shocks  are  important,  especially 
terms of trade shocks in open economy models, where exchange rate 
regimes  make a difference.  But  monetary  policy cannot  do that  much to 
offset productivity  shocks anyway.  In traditional  textbook  models, neg- 
ative supply shocks reduce output below potential and raise prices. 
Central  banks can do no more than choose a slightly different  combina- 
tion of these two "bads,"  whereas monetary  policy can  potentially  fully 
offset  shocks in money demand and other determinants  of demand. So 
why the neglect of AD shocks? 
The Corsetti-Pesenti  Model in Terms  of the True  AD-AS Graph 
Here, with the authors'  help, I show how their  model works in terms  of 
graphs  that  truly  merit  the label  AD-AS  rather  than  the production  func- 
tion graph which usurps that name in their paper.  So the price level is 
now on the vertical  axis, and the horizontal  axis represents  Consump- 
tion, which is the authors'  chosen quantity  measure.  We  begin, in figure 
2C2.1, by showing the effects of a positive supply shock in a closed 
economy.  A productivity  shock raises  potential  output from  ZJ to Z2l.  If 
prices  are flexible,  the economy moves from O to the higher  output (but 
unchanged employment). If prices are sticky, the economy is stuck at 
point O, which is now relabeled B to indicate that employment has 
fallen. The policy implication  is that the authorities  should use mone- 
tary expansion to shift AD out until the economy is at point A, thereby 
reproducing  the real equilibrium  of the flexible price case, eliminating 
the unemployment  that is present at point B, and achieving the higher 
level of output that  has become available  at potential. 
Now that  we have seen it in standard  AS-  AS terms,  I have mixed feel- 
ings about  this exercise.  On the one hand, the inability  to show explicitly 
the fall in employment in this graph  is precisely  the reason  why the au- 
thors prefer  to use the production  function graphs that appear  in their 
paper.  On the other  hand, I question  whether  the single most important 
experiment  on which to focus is one in which a positive (supply) shock 
is associated  with unemployment.  Again, my view is that  if the topic of 
interest  is the scope for monetary  policy to respond to possible unem- 
ployment and an output gap, then it is more important  to focus on de- 
mand shocks;  here,  the AS-  AD framework  would be more  illuminating. 
Figure  2C2.2  repeats the productivity-shock  experiment  for the case 
of an open economy.  Here,  the most interesting  result  is the comparison Comment  123 
Figure 2C2.1 
Productivity  shock  (accommodated  by monetary  expansion)  in a closed economy 
of the consequences  of the three alternate  assumptions regarding  how 
prices  are  set. We  see that  the increase  in potential  output/consumption 
(which  corresponds  to the actual  increase,  if sufficiently  accommodated 
by monetary  expansion), is smallest in the case of Producer  Currency 
Pricing,  largest in the case of Local  Currency  Pricing (LCP),  and inter- 
mediate in the case of Dollar  Pricing  (DP).  The reason  follows from the 
fact  that  the monetary  expansion  is accompanied  by a nominal  currency 
deprecation.  Under  PCP,  import  prices  rise in proportion  to the depreci- 
ation, and in the authors'  telling, the home country loses consumption 
and welfare  because the terms  of trade  worsen, whereas under LCP  the 
terms  of trade  improve,  allowing the home country  higher  consumption 
and welfare.  In both cases the changes in the terms  of trade  and in wel- 
fare  -  worsening under PCP but improving under LCP  -  come at the 
expense  of the foreign  country.  Dollar  Pricing  combines  properties  of the 
other  two. The  differences  show up only in consumption,  not in output, 
which is at the level of potential in all three cases. These results are of 
substantive  interest.  I do not think  I have seen them before  in the litera- 
ture. There  is a question, however, whether the results come from the 
terms of trade effects that the authors  identify,  or instead are simply a 
consequence  of their  choice  of money demand function,  M = PC,  which 124  Frankel 
Figure 2C2.2 
Productivity shock in an open economy 
in itself imposes an inverse relationship  between M and C, given that  P 
is fixed under LCP.1 
More on the Slope of the Phillips Curve under Globalization 
Consider  the slope of the Phillips Curve:  the magnitude  of the increase 
in inflation  resulting  from  a given expansion  of domestic  demand  (or  the 
fall in inflation resulting from a given contraction  in demand). Some 
suggest that globalization  implies that inflation is less sensitive to do- 
mestic  demand  conditions,  and more  to global  demand  conditions,  than 
it used to be:  Borio  and Filardo  (2006),  Fisher  (2005),  IMF  (2006,  pp. 106- 
108),  Kohn  (2006),  and Yellen  (2006),  who calls this the new view. The  ar- 
gument is that foreign supply is more readily substituted  for domestic 
output than before, so that the Phillips curve is flatter.  (Firms  have less 
pricing  power.)  Others  suggest that  globalization  has produced  a steeper 
Phillips curve: Dornbusch and Krugman (1976, pp. 570-573), Romer 
(1993),  Rogoff  (2004).  The argument  is that  it is harder  to raise  output- Comment  125 
a country  pays the price  of monetary  expansion  more  quickly,  especially 
if the exchange  rate  is floating  -  because the economy more closely ap- 
proximates the frictionless, perfectly competitive neoclassical para- 
digm. As much as international  competition,  Rogoff (2004)  has in mind 
domestic sources of increased  competitiveness  from deregulation,  pri- 
vatization,  decreased  union power, and the advent of Wal-Mart,  Ama- 
zon, and eBay.2 
Remarkably,  both camps, those who argue that globalization  makes 
the Phillips curve flatter  and those who argue that it makes it steeper, 
are suggesting that it results  in lower inflation.  In the new view, a given 
monetary  expansion,  or a given target  in terms of output, is associated 
with lower inflation. The Romer (1993)-Rogoff  (2004) claim that the 
Phillips  curve  is steeper  of course  recognizes  the implication  that  a given 
monetary  expansion  will lead to higher inflation.  But  it goes on to point 
out that precisely because it would accomplish little, central  banks in 
highly open economies will refrain  from monetary expansion. People 
are aware of this, which reduces their expectations  of inflation.  The re- 
sult in the general equilibrium  of rational  expectations  (Barro-Gordon 
1983)  is that open economies will exhibit  less inflationary  bias than less 
open, less competitive  economies.  The  attractiveness  of this model from 
a theoretical  viewpoint is that  it provides the missing theoretical  ration- 
ale for the common claim that an increase  in the level  of globalization 
produces  a permanent  fall in the average  rate  of inflation.  Romer  (1993) 
and Lane (1997)  produced evidence that more open countries indeed 
have lower inflation  rates.3 
The  April  2006  IMF  World  Economic  Outlook  finds that  a trend  increase 
in trade openness in a given sector tends on average to lead to a trend 
decline in the relative producer  price in that sector (for 1987-2003;  fig. 
3.11).  This suggests a microeconomic  competitiveness  effect. While the 
effect cannot  come from aggregate  Phillips Curves or monetary  policy, 
it does validate the link from increased trade to decreased monopoly 
power  -  increased import competition drives down profit margins  - 
which in turn firms up the link between globalization and domestic 
sources of increased competition such as deregulation, privatization, 
and decreased  power of organized  labor.4 
I offer a tentative proposal for reconciling the new view with the 
Romer  (1993)-Rogoff  (2004)  view. Individual  firms  in many sectors  face 
increased  international  competition.  As a result, it is true that they op- 
erate  in more  competitive  markets  and have less pricing  power.  In other 
words, they face  more  elastic  demand  for their  products  because  of elas- 126  Frankel 
tic supply from  competitors.  In response,  they develop new pricing  pol- 
icies, which involve setting prices more frequently  and more flexibly 
in response to market  conditions.  But it would be a fallacy  of composi- 
tion to say that U. S. producers in the aggregate have more elastic 
supply. Rather,  the Aggregate Supply relationship  becomes closer to 
vertical. It becomes harder for monetary policy to push output away 
from  potential. 
But perhaps  the slope of the Phillips curve is a red herring.  If global- 
ization and other sources of increased  productivity  narrow  the gap be- 
tween potential output and the level of output to which the public as- 
pires,  it can  bring  down the rate  of inflation.  This  is true  regardless  of the 
slope of the Phillips  curve,  and regardless  whether  we are  talking  about 
the discretionary  policy equilibrium  for a given level of expected infla- 
tion or the long-run  rational  expectations  equilibrium. 
For much of the public, statistical  measures of economic integration 
would be beside the point. The 800-pound  panda in the boat is China, 
which is accompanied  by various other tigers and jaguars.  It is pointed 
out that (in the roundest  of numbers)  a billion low-  wage workers  are in 
the process of joining the world economy.  It is already  clear  that China 
has put substantial  downward pressure  on prices  of clothing  and many 
other  manufactured  goods.5  It is important  to remember  that  China  has 
also put upward pressure on oil and other agricultural  and mineral 
products. But for most countries,  the effects on the terms of trade and 
real income have been positive  -  certainly for commodity producers, 
including to an extent the United States  -  though not for rival produc- 
ers of labor-intensive  manufactures. 
The  effects  do not necessarily  show up in econometric  studies to date. 
A limitation  to statistical  analysis  of China's  impact  on U. S. inflation  or 
other international  variables is that China's substantial  weight in the 
global economy is such a recent  phenomenon.6  But the effect is clearly 
there.  And the public's  intuition  is right,  that the biggest impact  of low- 
wage Chinese  and Indian  workers  joining  the world workforce  remains 
in the future.  It  is but the most dramatic  illustration  of how globalization 
is indeed changing  the parameters  of the American  economy. 
Miscellaneous Reactions 
The conclusion that dollar pricing leads to asymmetric transmission 
one-way from the United States to RoW (Rest  of World)  sounds like a Comment  127 
welcome possible answer to the puzzle of why, even post-EMU  (Euro- 
pean Economic  and Monetary  Union), the United States economy, the 
Federal  Reserve Board,  and the New York  financial  community seem 
still more powerful in the world than, respectively,  the European  econ- 
omy, the European  Central  Bank,  and the London  financial  community. 
Finally,  an issue in which I have personal interest.  The authors find 
that  optimal  monetary  policy targets  a price  index ". . . assigning  higher 
weights (other things equal) to the core sectors in which nominal ri- 
gidities are more pronounced."  Mankiw  and Reis (2003)  and Woodford 
(2003) have produced similar results, so the authors are in excellent 
company.  But it seems to me that the conclusion might change if one 
included exogenous terms of trade shocks (most relevant for min- 
eral exporters) and the necessity of including external balance as an 
objective  -  stemming  from  imperfectly  functioning  international  finan- 
cial markets  -  alongside the objective  of internal  balance.  I want the tar- 
geted price  index to emphasize  volatile commodity  export  prices,  so the 
currency automatically depreciates in response to adverse terms of 
trade  shock. 
Charles  Engel at the conference  mentioned targeting  the PPI  instead 
of the CPI.  For  example, if the world price of oil or coffee falls, should 
monetary  policy in countries  that produce those commodities expand 
enough to depreciate  the currency?  I would say yes, in order  to accom- 
modate adverse terms of trade shock. The PPI  target  has this property, 
as does targeting  an export  price index (Peg the Export  Price,  or PEP).7 
But  CPI  targeting  does not have this property,  especially  if low weight is 
assigned to sectors  in which nominal rigidities  are absent. 
All in all, Corsetti  and Pesenti have examined a wide variety of im- 
portant  assumptions  and policy questions within the New Open Econ- 
omy Macroeconomics.  I am grateful for their valiant attempt to do so 
within a simple graphical  apparatus  that would be expositionally  use- 
ful. But  I personally  would have preferred  some attention  to Aggregate 
Demand  shocks,  and in any case I cannot  agree  that it is appropriate  for 
the authors  to label their  production  functions  AS  -AD curves. 
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Notes 
1. The macroeconomic  consequences  of LCP  versus PCP  have been extensively  worked 
out by others cited by the authors,  including in particular  Devereux and Engel (2003, 
2004),  Devereux,  Engel,  and Tille  (2003),  and Engel  (2002,  2005). 
2. A variant  of the argument  in Rogof  f (2004)  is that  the  higher  level of real  income  that  re- 
sults from globalization  narrows  the gap between desired output and potential  output, 
and thus reduces  the inflation  bias in the Barro-Gordon  model. (This  is close to the wage 
aspiration  argument  made previously.)  Loungani  and Razin  (2006)  reach  the same con- 
clusion. 
3. A more  recent  examination  is Gruben  and McLeod  (2004). 
4. There  are signs of this even in Europe,  where regional  integration  through  the Euro- 
pean Union is a possible  contributing  factor  (Blanchard  and Philippon  2003). 
5. For  example,  Fishman  (2005). 
6. Kamin,  Marazzi,  and Schindler  (2004). 
7. Frankel  (2003,  2005). 
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